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FEA TURE AR TICL E
The NHTSA's Evaluation of Automobile
Safety Systems: Active or Passive?
By Haroon H. Hamid*

I. Introduction
Since the first Ford Model T rolled off the assembly line, the
regulation of automobile safety systems ("safety systems") has
changed drastically. While the regulation of safety systems was nonexistent at the birth of the Model T, the practice is abundant today.
Modem automobile safety regulation saw its beginning in the late
1960s with the advent of seat belt laws, vehicle crashworthiness tests,
and more recently the regulation of air bags. As a result, the United
States has developed some of the world's most stringent automobile
safety standards.
Despite stringent application of the safety standards, 2.9 million people were injured and 42,643 died as a result of 6.3 million reported traffic crashes in 2003.' While not all of these crashes can be
attributed to the lack of regulatory consideration of a specific feature,
a number of crashes resulting from loss of vehicle control could have
been prevented had the vehicles been equipped with Electronic Stability Control ("ESC"), a type of Active safety system2 available today. In 2004, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety determined
that "[i]f all vehicles on U.S. roads had ESC, we might avoid as many
* First-year associate at Duval & Stachenfeld LLP in New York, NY; Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, J.D. 2006; University of Michigan Ann Arbor, B.S. 2002. I am extremely grateful to my parents Humayun and
Kausar Hamid for this paper would not have been possible without their continuous
support and encouragement. Many thanks to Valeria Kozhich for her helpful comments, suggestions, and support.
' National Center for Statistics and Analysis, Traffic Safety Facts - 2003 Data,
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSF2003/809767.pdf (last visited
Feb. 21, 2007).
2 See infra § II(B) and accompanying notes.
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as 800,000 of the 2 million or so single vehicle crashes that occur
each year. About 14,000 fatal single vehicle crashes occurred in
2003, which3 means [there is] a potential to save more than 7,000 lives
each year.

The regulation of seat belts and air bags, both Passive safety
systems,4 has been chaotic. 5 In 1967, the appearance of the primary
Passive system standard regulating seat belts prompted the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), the frontline
regulator of automobile safety in the U.S., to issue specific safety
standards. Congress, courts, and presidential administrations, as well
as the automobile industry and private and public interest groups,
have since cajoled and directly lobbied the NHTSA to adopt a patchwork of contradictory regulations. One stark example is the air bag
safety standard, which the NHTSA enacted, revoked, suspended and
reinstated with disastrous consequences. The NHTSA's inertia in
regulating air bags resulted in varying air bag designs that ultimately
harmed U.S. consumers, particularly children and improperly seated
vehicle occupants. 6

The NHTSA has largely ignored Active safety systems. 7 It
only recently began considering such systems after Congress's directive to mandate a Tire Pressure Monitoring System ("TPMS") - an
Active safety system. 8 Still, the NHTSA was susceptible to pressures
from the automobile industry as it attempted to mandate an inferior,
albeit slightly cheaper, TPMS standard for automobile manufacturers.
Ultimately, private interest groups and the judiciary directed the
NHTSA to mandate the more effective TPMS standard.
As far as ESC, the NHTSA announced only in late 2006 that
it is considering mandating the safety system on all passenger vehicles starting in 2009.9 Given the agency's chaotic regulatory track
3 INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY

(IIHS), ELECTRONIC STABILITY
SINGLE-VEHICLE CRASH
IS
TO
REDUCE
EFFECT
MAIN
EFFECTIVE:
CONTROL FOUND
RISK, INCLUDING THE RISK OF FATAL SINGLE-VEHICLE CRASHES (Oct. 28, 2004),

available at http://www.iihs.org/news/2004/iihsnews102804.pdf
Feb. 27, 2007) [hereinafter IIHS Study].
4See infra § II(A) and accompanying notes.

(last visited

5Id.
61d.

7 See

infra § II(B) and accompanying notes.

81d.
9 Joe Benton, Feds Order ElectronicStability Control on All Cars, CONSUMER

(Sept. 2006), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2006/09/nhtsa_ stability.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2007).
AFF.
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record, this is still an open question.
The NHTSA has failed to take initiative in evaluating new
safety systems for regulatory consideration because it lacks a standard by which to evaluate safety systems. Consequently, the agency
must now develop a fair way to evaluate whether a safety system is
ripe for present regulatory consideration.
In this Note, I propose a framework the NHTSA could use to
evaluate whether a safety system is ripe for present regulatory consideration or whether it deserves deferred consideration pending a
timely re-evaluation. Section II discusses the evolution of automobile safety regulation in the U.S. and examines the regulation of Passive and Active safety systems. Section III first suggests that the
NHTSA must take greater initiative in evaluating safety systems for
regulatory consideration. Second, it examines the current standard
for regulation of safety systems. Third, it proposes a framework for
regulation of safety systems. Fourth, the section provides a practical
application of the proposed framework. Fifth, it evaluates a current
Active safety system - ESC, within the proposed framework. Last, it
considers the steps the agency should take after completing the
evaluation.

II. The Evolution of Automobile Safety Regulation in
the United States
In 1966, the U.S. Congress enacted a new strategy for decreasing highway fatalities. Spurred by an increasing number of
automobiles on U.S. roads and the resulting increase in deaths on
U.S. highways, Congress opted to refocus federal oversight on improving automobile design and safety systems. 10 Unfortunately, the
few safety systems that existed at the time were in their infancy."I
Before requiring that automobile manufacturers implement a particular safety system, Congress considered several factors, including the
12
system's overall usefulness and its relative costs and benefits.
Congress attempted to address the increase in automobile-related fatalities by enacting the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966 ("Motor Vehicle Safety Act"). 13 Despite numerous revisions over the years, the basic mandate of the Motor Vehicle Safety
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 33 (1983).
10Motor
l1 Id.
2

| 1d

"

131Id "
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Act remains the same. 14 The Act requires the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe automobile safety standards that are practicable,
meet the
need for motor vehicle safety, and are stated in objective
5
1
terms.
The Motor Vehicle Safety Act delegates the responsibilities of
the Secretary of Transportation to the Administrator of the National
Highway Traffic and Safety Administration ("NHTSA"),16 an agency
of the U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT"). 17 As an agency
of the DOT, the NHTSA has a legislative mandate under the Motor
Vehicle Safety Act to issue Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards8
("Safety Standards") that automobile manufacturers must follow.'
The Safety Standards are the minimum safety performance requirements for automobiles.' 9 Today these standards cover
everything
2

from rear-view

20

mirrors

to occupant crash protection. '

Automobile safety systems, which cover a wide range of features, are divided into two classes: Passive safety systems and Active
safety systems. Since the systems are fundamentally different in nature, it is helpful to trace the development of each system separately.
A. Passive Safety Systems
1. Definition of Passive Safety Systems
Passive safety systems ("Passive systems") are automobile
14Motor Vehicle Safety Act (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 3010130170 (2005)) [hereinafter Motor Vehicle Safety Act].
15Id. § 30111 (a).
16 Cynthia M. Certo, Comment, 1993 Changes to Safety Standard 208: Deploy-

ing an (Air) Bag Full of Product Liability Claims?, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 674
(1994).
17

U.S.

Department

of

Transportation,

DOT

Agencies

(2007),

http://www.dot.gov/DOTagencies.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (listing the agencies that are under the authority of the Department of Transportation).
18National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Booklet on Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards (1999),
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/import/FMVSS (last visited Feb. 28, 2007) (providing an overview and brief description of safety standards in effect as of Dec. 1998) [hereinafter Booklet on Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards].
19 Id.

20 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 571.111 (2005).
21 Id. § 571.208.
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safety systems that are only deployed or effective in response to an
automobile crash. These
•
• systems
22 protect drivers and passengers from
injury once a collision occurs.
Passive systems include seat belts,
air bags, headrests, and the passenger-safety cage. 23
The air bag, a Passive system which is now mandatory in
every new automobile sold in the U.S., 24 works in conjunction with
the seat belt to provide two levels of safety in the event of a crash.
Although current NHTSA regulations require air bags only for front
passengers, many advocates are pushing for the installation of advanced air bags to protect all passengers. 2 5 Advanced air bags include "smart" air bags and front and rear side "curtain" air bags that
provide greater protection than regular air bags for all passengers in
the event of an accident. Smart air bags detect passenger weight and
proximity and tailor air bag deployment to passengers' needs.
Curtain air bags extend from the front to the rear of the vehicle like an
inflatable curtain, protecting both front and rear passengers.2 7
Vehicle crashworthiness ("Crashworthiness") is another regulated Passive system. The regulation of Crashworthiness began in the
late 1960s 28 and today all vehicles in the U.S. are required to pass
29
mandated Crashworthiness tests before they are sold to the public.
Crashworthiness includes vehicle design and the use of advanced
metal alloys in vehicle construction. Thus, improved Crashworthiness results in better protection for vehicle occupants.

22 Ben Whitworth, Safe Bet to Sell Cars, PROF. ENGINEERING, Feb. 23, 2000, at

45.
23 Miles Budimir, Coming: Cars Smarter than Their Drivers, MACHINE
DESIGN, Sept. 2, 2004, at 75.

24 Public Citizen, Key Advanced Air Bag Legislative History (providing that
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) requires all
passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1997 to be equipped with
driver and
passenger air bags and
manual
lap-shoulder belts),
http://www.citizen.org/autosafety/Air Bags/articles.cfm?ID=6022 (last visited Feb.
27, 2007) [hereinafter Key Air Bag Legislative History].

25 Id. (providing that the Transportation Equity Act for the 21 S"Century (TEA21) of 1998, authorizes the NHTSA to mandate the use of advanced air bags).
26 Nargess Shahmanesh, On the Development of Passive Safety Systems at
Mercedes-Benz, AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEER, Nov. 1999, at 44, 45.
27

Id. at 44.

28 Booklet on Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, supra note 18 (provid-

ing that the first Safety Standard on Crashworthiness was effective on a number of
vehicles manufactured on or after Jan. 1, 1968).
29 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2005).
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2. The Evolution of Passive Safety System Regulation in the
United States
The DOT's regulation of Passive systems, particularly seat
belts and air bags, has resulted in a confusing and contradictory array
of standards. Passive system requirements have been "promulgated,
revoked.., suspended, extended, amended, reinstated and generally
scrutinized by [the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government] ."

In 1967, the DOT issued Standard 208 - the primary Safety
Standard for Passive systems. 3 1 Standard 208, effective in 1968, required that simple seat belts be installed in automobiles. 32 The public, however, was slow to use these seat belts.33 As a result, the DOT
amended Standard 208 in 1972 to require the installation of automatic
35
seat belts 34 and air bags in automobiles manufactured after 1975.
Automobile manufacturers challenged the amended Standard 208 in
Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation.36 In Chrysler
Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that despite being practicable and meeting the need for motor vehicle safety,
the DOT failed to state Standard 208 in objective terms. 37 The court
ordered that implementation of Standard 208 be delayed.38 Thus, the
DOT shelved Standard 208 for five years under pressure from
39 the
automobile industry and under fear of further public resistance.
In 1977, President Jimmy Carter reinstated Standard 20840 requiring seat belts and air bags in all automobiles manufactured after
30

Certo, supra note 16, at 679.

31

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 34.

32

Booklet on FederalMotor Vehicle Safety Standards, supra note 18.

33 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 34.

34 Id. at 35. An automatic seat belt is "a traditional safety belt, which when fas-

tened to the interior of the door remains attached without impeding entry or exit
from the vehicle, and deploys automatically without any action [by] the passenger."
Id.
35 id.

Chrysler Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 663 (6th Cir. 1972).

36
37

Id. at 676.

38

1 d. at 681.

39 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 36-37.
40

Lauren Pacelli, Note, Asleep at the Wheel of Auto Safety? Recent Air Bag

Regulations by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 15 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 739, 753 (1999).

2007]

Automobile Safety Systems

1982. 4' In 1981, as a result of an economic recession and its effect
on the automobile industry, the NHTSA ordered a one-year delay on
the implementation of'the Passive system requirement of Standard
208 - which now mandated seat belts and air bags in all automobiles
manufactured after 1982.42 Soon after, however, the NHTSA 43revoked the Passive system requirement from Standard 208 entirely.
Automobile insurance companies challenged the NHTSA's
rescission of the Passive system requirement from Standard 208. In
1983, the U.S. Supreme Court in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass 'n of the
United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. held that the
NHTSA's rescission of the Passive system requirement from Standard 208 was arbitrary and capricious, 44 and remanded the matter
back to the NHTSA for further consideration.45 The NHTSA reinstated the Passive system requirement into Standard 208, effective as
of 1989.46 The Passive system requirement, however, was a compromise between automobile manufacturers and air bag proponents.47
Standard 208 allowed automobile manufacturers to implement the
Passive system requirement by selecting either "[1] a driver's side air
bag system and automatic front seat belts, [2] automatic front seat
48
belts, or [3] manual front seat belts with a belt warning system.,
Consequently, automobile manufacturers were still able to avoid installing air bags by choosing automatic front seat belts or manual
front seat belts with a belt warning system.
Finally, in 1991, Congress forced the NHTSA to require air
bags in vehicles by enacting the Ir~termodal Surface Transportation
and Efficiency Act ("ISTEA"). 4 1 Under the ISTEA, most automobiles were required to have drive" and passenger air bags in addition
to seat belts by 1998.50 In 1998, the NHTSA implemented this
41Id.; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 38.
42
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 38.
43

Id.

44

Id.at 46.

41

Id. at 57.

46 Pacelli, supra note 40, at 754.
47 Id.

48 Id.

49 Id. See generally, Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30102

(1994)).
50 Key Air Bag Legislative History, supra note 24.
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change in Standard 208. 5'
Although the NHTSA was eventually required to include air
bags as a Passive system in automobiles under the ISTEA, Congress
passed the Act far too late. Over the previous thirty years, market
forces had driven automobile manufacturers to satisfy the consumer
demand for air bags, notwithstanding congressional hesitancy.52
Without a legal standard in place, however, automobile manufacturers installed53 air bags that were dangerous for children and un-buckled
occupants.

As a result, Congress pushed the NHTSA to protect children
and un-buckled occupants by enacting the Transportation Equity Act
for the 21st Century ("TEA-21 ").5' The TEA-21 set goals to regulate
air bag production that the NHTSA must achieve by 2006. s 5 Despite
the Passive system debacle that continued for thirty years, the
NHTSA is still not proactive in regulating safety systems. The
agency continues to be directed by the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the automobile industry, and public and
private interest groups.
3. Active Safety Systems
a. Definition of Active Safety Systems
Active safety systems ("Active systems") help drivers avoid
accidents. These systems function behind the scenes, monitoring the
driving conditions and actively adjusting the driving dynamics of the
vehicle to minimize the risk of an accident. 56 Active systems provide
a degree of protection for occupants unavailable in Passive systems
and they reduce the likelihood of a situation that would require the
use of Passive systems.
The Antilock Braking System ("ABS") is one type of Active

51 Booklet on FederalMotor Vehicle Safety Standards,supra note 18.
52 Pacelli, supra note 40, at 754-55.
53 id.

54 Key Air Bag Legislative History, supra note 24; Transportation Equity Act

for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998).
55Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, §

7103(a), 112 Stat. 107 (1998).
56

Electronic Stability Control Coalition, http://www.dinkaboy.com/aboutesc/

how esc works/index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
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system. 57 While a regular braking system relies on human input - the
driver pushing the brake pedal, the ABS is controlled by a microprocessor that forces the system to brake up to fifteen times per second 58 to bring the vehicle to a stop as soon as possible. 59 The ABS is
superior to regular braking in preventing wheels from locking up, because human input-controlled standard braking systems cannot match
60
the rapid pulsing created by the microprocessor-controlled ABS.
As such, on slippery surfaces, the ABS provides better control than a
regular braking system.and may yield shorter stopping distances. 61
The Tire Pressure Monitoring System ("TPMS") is another
type of Active system. 62 The TPMS alerts drivers when their vehi63
cle's tire pressure is severely above or below the required pressure.
Tire pressure is an essential factor in vehicle safety and control because it determines the quality of contact between the vehicle and the
road. A typical TPMS has sensors inside each tire that send a pressure reading every 30-60 seconds to a receiver inside the vehicle. 64 If
any tire's pressure falls below or goes above a preset threshold value,
the driver is alerted to take appropriate action via a signal in the vehi65
cle's instrument panel.
Electronic Stability Control ("ESC") is an Active system that
is increasingly found in a greater number of vehicles. The ESC system is based on the premise that a computer-controlled system can
effectively monitor driving conditions and actively intervene before
an accident can occur. 66 The ESC system includes sensors in the
wheels and braking system that provide real-time information about

57

id.

58 Martin Lesae, Tips & Tricks - ABS Brakes, THE CAR MAG., available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20050216175345/http://www.thecarmagazine.com/en/i
nfo/tips/view.spy?artid=599 (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
'9 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Antilock Brake Systems
(ABS), http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/problems/Equipment/absbrakes/index.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2007).
60 Id.
61 id.
62 Glen Beanard, Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, BRAKE & FRONT END

(Oct. 2004), http://www.brakeandfrontend.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.

66 Whitworth, supra note 22, at 45-46.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 19:3

the intended course of the vehicle.67 Data from the sensors are used
to compare a driver's intended course with the vehicle's actual
movement; thus the ESC system can detect any deviation from the
vehicle's intended path.68 If there is any deviation, the ESC system
automatically intervenes by applying brakes and cutting engine69
power as needed to bring the vehicle back to its intended course.
For example, if the system detects that the vehicle's rear wheels are
slipping and causing the vehicle to yaw counter-clockwise to the
right, the ESC system may apply the brake to the right front wheel.70
A clockwise spin will then counteract the yaw and stabilize the vehicle. 7
b. The Evolution of Active Safety System Regulation in
the United States
The NHTSA did not regulate Active systems until Congress

required such regulation under the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation Act ("TREAD Act") of
2000. 72 Nevertheless, as with Passive system regulation, the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, automobile
manufacturers, and private and public interest groups direct the regulation of Active systems.
The TREAD Act prompted the NHTSA to consider regulating
Active systems, in particular, a TPMS.73 The Act forced the NHTSA
to mandate a Safety Standard requiring a TPMS in all new motor vehicles by 2003. 74 In response, the NHTSA conducted comparative
studies of the two types of TPMS available on the market to gauge

Id.

67

68

JENNIFER

N.

DANG,

PRELIMINARY RESULTS
STABILITY
CONTROL

U.S.

DEP'T OF

ANALYZING

(ESC)

TRANSP.,

EVALUATION

THE EFFECTIVENESS
SYSTEMS
(2004),

OF

NOTE:

ELECTRONIC

available

http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/regrev/evaluate/809790_files/809790.pdf

at

(last

visited Mar. 1, 2007) (hereinafter NHTSA ESC PreliminaryResults].
69 id.
Id.

70

71 id

Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation

72

Act, Pub. L. No. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000).
73

1Id.

74 Id.

§ 13.
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the benefits of a TPMS.7 5 The first type, a "direct" TPMS, alerts the
driver when the pressure in any tire falls below 80 percent of its recommended value. 76 A direct TPMS operates on vehicle start-up and
is effective independent of road conditions.
The second type is an
"indirect" TPMS, which alerts the driver when the pressure in any
tire falls below 70 percent of its recommended value.7 8 An indirect
TPMS, however, only starts to work after the vehicle has been driven
for several minutes and is not effective on uneven surfaces. 79 Moreover, the NHTSA estimated that a direct TPMS has the potential to
save 141-145 lives annually and to decrease the severity of 10,270 injuries annually. 80 An indirect TPMS, however, was estimated to save
79 lives annually and to decrease the severity of 5,176 injuries annually. 8 1 Therefore, the NHTSA determined that a direct TPMS was
82
preferable to an indirect TPMS as an Active system.
In 2002, despite the research results and under pressure from
the automobile industry, 8 3 the NHTSA issued Safety Standard 138,
which gave automobile manufacturers the option of installing the in-

OF

75 NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, AN EVALUATION
EXISTING TIRE PRESSURE MONITORING SYSTEMS (2001), available at

http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/vrtc/ca/capubs/tpms.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
76

Press Release, Public Citizen, Automakers Cannot Install Ineffective Sys-

tems for Detecting Under-inflated Tires, Appeals Court Rules (Aug. 7, 2003),
available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=1520 (last visited
Mar. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Public Citizen - Automakers Cannot Install Ineffective
Systems]; Tejas Desai, Steering Safer Wheels for America's Motorists, ACTIVE
COMPONENTS 50, 56 (June 2004), available at http://rfdesign.com/mag/radio-steeringsafer wheels/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
77 Public Citizen - Automakers Cannot Install Ineffective Systems, supra note
76; Desai, supranote 76.
78 Id.
79 Consumers Union, Consumers Union Comments to National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration on RIN 2127-AI33 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems; Controls and Displays (Aug. 24, 2001),
http://web.archive.org/web/20051204080709/http://www.consumersunion.org/othe
r/tiredc 1101 .htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).
80 Public Citizen - Automakers Cannot Install Ineffective Systems, supra note

76.
81 Id.
82

Public

Citizen,

Tire
Pressure
Monitoring
http://www.citizen.org/autosafety/nhtsa/tread/tpms/index.cfm
2007).
83 Id.

Systems
(TPMS),
(last visited Jan. 30,
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ferior indirect TPMS. 84 By giving automobile manufacturers the option to select their system of choice, the NHTSA took the same
course as it had done in 1989 with the Passive system Standard 208.85
Just as Congress took the initiative on Standard 208 by enacting the ISTEA in 1991, consumer advocacy groups took the initiative
on Standard 138 by filing a legal action against the NHTSA for buckling under pressure from the automobile industry and for violating the
purpose of the TREAD Act. 86 In Public Citizen, Inc. v. Norman Mineta,87 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that "the [NHTSA's] adoption of [an indirect TPMS] was both contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious, and [the] adoption of [a direct TPMS] [was] not."X8 Therefore, in 2003, Safety Standard 138
was vacated and remanded to the NHTSA for revisions. 89 The
NHTSA at last issued a final Safety Standard for a TPMS in 2005,
five years after Congress directed the NHTSA to issue a TPMS
Safety Standard under the TREAD Act of 2000.90
With respect to ESC, an Active system, the NHTSA only in
late 2006 expressed an interest to mandate the system in all automobiles in the U.S. starting with the 2009 model year. 91 The Agency
has issued a notice of a proposed rule. 92 However, given its chaotic
track record both with Passive systems and with the TPMS, the end
result remains to be seen.

84

85

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 138, 49 C.F.R § 571.138 (2002).
See supra § II(A)(2) and accompanying notes.

Danny Hakim, The Center for Auto Safety, U.S. Court Rejects Tire Safety
Rule, (Aug. 7, 2002), http://www.autosafety.org/article.php?scid=186&did=1147
(last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
87 Public Citizen, Inc. v. Norman Mineta, 340 F.3d 39, 63 (2d Cir. 2003).
86

88

Id.at 62.

89

Id.at 63.

90

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, TREAD Milestones,

http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/rulings/TREAD/MileStones/index.html (providing
completion dates for TPMS proposed rules but no completion date for the final

rule).
91 See Benton, supra note 9.
92

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSP., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,

NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING, 49 CFR PARTS 571 AND 585, FEDERAL MOTOR
VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS; ELECTRONIC STABILITY CONTROL SYSTEMS, available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/DOT/NHTSAfRulemaking/Rules/Associated%20Files/ESC NPRM.pdf.
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III. The Need for Greater linitiative in Regulating
Safety Systems
A. Current Standard for Regulation of Safety Systems
The NHTSA has historically been passive in considering
safety systems for regulation. Its regulatory experience with Passive
systems has been chaotic, particularly with air bags. Although the
NHTSA originally took the initiative to propose a Safety Standard for
Passive systems, Standard 208 was ultimately pushed through the
regulatory process by the government, the automobile industry, and
interest groups. In the case of air bags, the NHTSA spent almost
thirty years being pushed in various directions
before Congress di93
rected it to mandate air bags under the ISTEA.
The NHTSA's regulatory experience with Active systems has
been even bleaker than with Passive systems. The agency displayed
little initiative in considering any Active systems for regulation until
Congress passed the TREAD Act of 2000. Due to the TREAD Act's
congressional mandate to consider a TPMS for regulation, the
NHTSA researched and published a Safety Standard in 2002. 94
However, since automobile manufacturers influenced the Safety
Standard, public interest groups, through the judiciary, sought a revision of the Standard that forced the NHTSA to revise its Safety Standard. The final revised Safety Standard was published in 2005, five
years after Congress pushed the NHTSA to consider an Active system.
Although a fixed process is lacking, the regulation of a safety
system usually involves the preliminary study of a safety system, followed by a proposed Safety Standard and then a final Safety Standard. 95 The NHTSA's inertia is most damaging in the preliminary research phase - the decision-making process that leads the agency to
evaluate whether a safety system is ripe for regulatory consideration.
The NHTSA has failed to learn from its historical experience,
and thus the agency does not subscribe to a fixed standard when determining whether to evaluate a safety system for regulatory consid93 See supra § II(A)(2) and accompanying notes.
94 See supra § II(B)(2) and accompanying notes.
95 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Vehicle Safety Rulemak-

ing

Priorities

and

Supporting

Research:

2003-2006

-

Introduction,

http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/rulings/PriorityPlan/FinalVeh/Index.html#idx 1
(last visited Mar. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Rulemaking Priorities].
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eration. The NHTSA claims that it evaluates safety systems for regulatory consideration based on "[the] likelihood of solutions,
[e]xecutive initiatives, [c]ongressional interest and mandates, petitions to the agency.., recommendations.., and changes needed as a
result of new vehicle technologies." 96 The NHTSA also considers
cost-benefit estimates and the severity of the problem in prioritizing
safety systems for consideration. 97 Under this fluctuating standard,
the NHTSA has deferred consideration of Active systems such as
ESC. 98

The lack of a fixed standard and the delayed consideration of
Active systems indicates that the NHTSA lacks a mechanism to
evaluate the ripeness of a safety system for regulatory consideration.
To determine whether a safety system is ripe for regulatory consideration, the agency should consider the safety system under a more
concrete standard, such as a defined factor framework.
B. Proposed Standard for Regulation of Safety Systems
The framework for analyzing whether a safety system is ripe
for regulatory review was developed after considering the NHTSA's
congressional mandate, 99 its historical experience1 °° and the fluctuating standard that is currently employed in considering safety systems.10 1 As a result, the framework can be used to decide which
safety systems deserve to be considered for further evaluation. The
factors of the framework, (1) safety track record, (2) preliminary
cost-benefit analysis, and (3) availability, are explained below.
1. Safety Track Record
A safety system's safety track record can be traced back to the
NHTSA's congressional mandate under the Motor Vehicle Safety
Act. This legislation requires in part that the NHTSA 1°2 "consider

96 id.
97 Id.
98

Id. (providing that the ESC system is a future consideration).

99 See supra § II and accompanying notes.
100 Id.
1'0See supra § III(A) and accompanying notes.

The Motor Vehicle Safety Act states "Secretary of Transportation," however, as described in § II supra, the same responsibility falls on the NHTSA as an
agency of the Department of Transportation.
102
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relevant available motor vehicle safety information ' 03 to determine
Safety Standards. 10 4 (Emphasis added). A vehicle's safety track record is the relevant available motor vehicle safety information. Accordingly, the NHTSA has congressional authority to use the safety
track record as a factor in evaluating new safety systems.
The NHTSA's current research practice uses vehicle crash
data in evaluating the effectiveness of a safety system. In September
2004, the agency conducted a preliminary study of the ESC Active
05
system using national crash data from state and federal databases.,
The NHTSA concluded that it would "feel more confident about the
overall effectiveness of ESC when [there] is enough data on a more
representative cross-section of the [U.S. automobile] fleet including
non-luxury vehicles and a wider variety of manufacturers."'06 (Emphasis added). Although the NHTSA uses the safety track record as
part of its research of a safety system, its main focus is on national
crash data. In its preliminary study of the ESC system, the NHTSA
used "crash data ...from 5 States, [and] ... also evaluated [the ESC
systemj by analyzing FARS [Fatality Analysis Reporting System]
data.' 1 7 FARS data contain crash information from "the [fifty]
States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico." 108 The NHTSA's
additional sources of data are also based on national crash statistics. 10 9
Under the NHTSA's congressional mandate, the safety track
record should cover a range of data broader than merely national
crash data. The NHTSA's mandate is to consider "relevant""10 and

103Motor

Vehicle Safety Act, supra note 14, § 30111 (b)(1).

10 4

id.

105 NHTSA ESC PreliminaryResults, supra note 68.
106 id.
107 Id.

108National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Fatality Analysis Reporthttp://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrdBrochure,
(FARS)
ing
System
30/NCSA/FARS/809-726/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2007) (providing that the
Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) contains data derived from a census of
fatal traffic crashes within the fifty States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto

Rico).
'09NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NAT'L CENTER FOR STATISTICS

AND ANALYSIS (NCSA) BROCHURE (2001), available at http://wwwnrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/NCSABrochure.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2007)

(listing all data sources used by the NHTSA).
"oMotor Vehicle Safety Act, supra note 14.
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"available"' 11 vehicle safety data. Thus, relevant data should encompass a larger sample than simply a representative cross-section of the
national automobile fleet. The better approach is to consider not only
national crash data, but also to seek out available data from foreign
experience and findings from private research.
The fundamental difference between Passive and Active systems justifies the expansion of what is seen as relevant safety data.
Passive systems function only after an automobile accident has occurred.112 In contrast, Active systems function continuously, working
to keep the occupants safe at all times. 1 3 As a result, data on the effectiveness of Passive systems are readily available after an accident
regardless of whether the systems functioned properly or not. Data
on Active systems, however, are most often available only when such
systems fail to function. Since Active systems work behind the
scenes to actively monitor the vehicle, the times that they actually
work will not be accurately reflected in statistical data. Thus, the
NHTSA's national data centered approach for safety track record is
ineffective for Active systems.
To evaluate a safety track record for Active systems, the relevant data considered should include: (a) national government crash
data, (b) foreign government crash data, and (c) national and foreign
private research. The evaluation of national government crash data is
a continuation of the NHTSA's current practice of evaluating data
from state and federal crash databases. Foreign government crash
data covers all relevant and available studies conducted by governmental agencies overseas. National and foreign private research covers all relevant and available studies conducted by non-governmental
entities. Expanding the available data set helps provide a more comprehensive picture, and thus puts the NHTSA in a better position to
evaluate the safety track record of Active systems. Moreover, since
this approach builds upon the NHTSA's current method, it may also
be effective with Passive systems. Finally, based on the relevant
data, a determination is made on whether the safety system being
evaluated has a strong or weak safety track record.
2. Preliminary Cost-Benefit Analysis
The preliminary cost-benefit analysis factor is also rooted in
the NHTSA's congressional mandate under the Motor Vehicle Safety
111Id.
112 See supra § II(A)(1) and accompanying notes.
113 See

supra § II(B)(1) and accompanying notes.
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Act. The Motor Vehicle Safety Act requires that the NHTSA consider "whether a proposed standard is reasonable, practicable, and
appropriate for the particular type of motor vehicle."' 14 (Emphasis
added). The word "practicable" was understood by legislators to "include technological ability to achieve the goal of a particular standard
as well as consideration of economic factors." 5 (Emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Senate Commerce Committee that recommended
the Motor Vehicle Safety Act recognized that in issuing Safety Standards "the Secretary [of Transportation] will necessarily consider
[the] reasonableness of cost."1 116 Preliminary cost-benefit evaluation
involves the consideration of economic factors and the reasonableness in cost of a proposed standard. The NHTSA claims that it uses
cost-benefit analysis in its regulatory evaluation. 1 17 The agency uses
' 8
"best educated estimates of the cost and ... of potential benefits."
However, there is no explanation on what such educated estimates
include.
Although an in-depth cost-benefit analysis is a detailed statistical inquiry, the preliminary phase of selecting a safety system for
consideration requires only a simple preliminary cost-benefit analysis. The purpose of such an analysis is to filter out extreme cases in
which the costs of a safety system are currently so prohibitive that the
safety system fails to justify consideration at the moment.
To perform a preliminary cost-benefit analysis, the NHTSA
should define the safety system's cost as the product of the average
market price of the safety system and the number of automobiles in
the U.S. ("National Price"). The system's benefit should be defined
as the estimate of the number of lives saved by implementing such a
system ("Lifesaving Potential"). The average market price of the
safety system is determined by conducting a survey of automobile
manufacturers that offer the safety system in their automobiles. The
number of automobiles in the U.S. is gathered from the appropriate
Census figures. Relevant studies on the efficacy of the system are
used to obtain an estimate of the number of lives that could be saved.
To analyze the safety system's National Price and Lifesaving
Potential, the system is compared to a safety system that the NHTSA
1"4 Motor Vehicle Safety Act, supra note 14, § 30111 (b)(3).
115H & H Tire Co. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 471 F.2d 350, 353 (7th
Cir. 1972) (citing House Debate 112 Cong. Rec. 19648 (Aug. 17, 1966)).
1 16
1d. (citing 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966, p.
2714).
17 Rulemaking Priorities,supra note 95.
118 id.
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has regulated in the past. The most likely candidates are Passive systems. 1 9 The National Price of the Passive system and its Lifesaving
Potential can then be compared with the National Price and Lifesaving Potential of the safety system being evaluated. On one hand, the
benefit of a safety system being evaluated will outweigh its cost if the
National Price and Lifesaving Potential of the system are similar to
those of a Passive system - one that the NHTSA presumably accepted if it was regulated. On the other hand, the cost of the safety
system under evaluation will outweigh its benefit if the National
Price and Lifesaving Potential vary significantly.
In the specific analysis above, a safety system's cost is limited
to its National Price and its benefit is limited to its Lifesaving Potential, primarily for pragmatic and illustrative purposes. However, a
number of ways exist to determine a safety system's cost and benefit.
For example, cost could include other available data such as an increase in a vehicle's fuel consumption due to the added weight of the
safety system. This added cost may change the outcome of the costbenefit analysis. In the same way, benefit could include projections
of a reduction in injuries or in insurance claims. The values used to
determine cost and benefit can also be adjusted for inflation. Ultimately, the purpose of this factor is to roughly address the economic
costs of a safety system, not to perform a complex mathematical calculation. Thus, for ease of illustration, cost is limited to the National
Price of a safety system while the benefit is limited to its Lifesaving
Potential.
3. Availability
The availability of a safety system on the market has historically played a part in the regulation of safety systems.12 0 In 1972, the
DOT recognized that automobile manufacturers would not voluntarily install air bags into new vehicles. Thus, the DOT took on the
task of mandating the air bag as part of a Passive system requirement
under Standard 208, albeit unsuccessfully. 22 In 1991, Congress also
recognized that despite the revised Standard 208, automobile manufacturers did not incorporate air bags into new vehicles. As a result,
Congress required the NHTSA to mandate air bags under the

"9 See supra § 11(A) and accompanying notes.
120 See supra § 11(A) - (B) and accompanying notes.
121

122

See supra § II and accompanying notes.
See supra § II(A)(2) and accompanying notes.
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ISTEA. 123 Thus, the availability of a safety system has been an important factor in safety system regulation.
A safety system's availability can be determined by examining the proportion of the national automobile fleet which currently offers the particular safety system. If a safety system is not offered at
all, it is unavailable. If it is offered only in luxury vehicles and not
across the national automobile fleet, it has limited availability. If,
however, a safety system is offered in both luxury and non-luxury
vehicles, and across the national automobile fleet, it is readily available.
To evaluate the availability of a safety system, it must be
compared with the availability of the same system overseas. This
evaluation is accomplished by considering the automobile fleets in
other developed countries. If such a comparison demonstrates a large
gap between U.S. availability and overseas availability, that may be
grounds for concern. Nevertheless, if a safety system is available
overseas and not in the U.S. or vice versa, that does not necessarily
indicate a problem. Such a discrepancy in availability, however,
raises a flag and calls for closer scrutiny of the safety system.
The NHTSA's historical experience with air bags demonstrates that when a safety system with varying standards is left to the
will of automobile manufacturers, long run problems for consumers
may ensue.' 24 Therefore, even if a safety system is readily available,
the NHTSA should evaluate whether the system has varying standards that may be a cause for concern.
C. Practical Application of the Proposed Standard for
Regulation of Safety Systems
Once a safety system has been evaluated under the factor
framework described above, the NHTSA must decide whether the
factors point towards considering the safety system or towards delaying consideration of the system. To decide this issue, I propose that
the safety track record, the preliminary cost-benefit analysis, and
availability of the safety system on the market are independently
evaluated and each is assigned a value ranging from 1 to 4. 12 Thus,
for the safety track record factor, a value of 1 indicates a weak safety
track record, while a value of 4 indicates a strong safety track record.
Likewise, for the preliminary cost-benefit analysis factor, a value of 1
123

Id.

124 See supra § II(A)(2) and accompanying notes.
125

Values ranging from 1 to 4 were selected to facilitate illustration.

NHTSA may select a larger range, for example from 1 - 100.

The
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indicates that the system's cost outweighs its benefit, while a value of
4 indicates that the system's benefit outweighs its cost. For the availability factor, however, a value of 1 indicates that the safety system is
readily available while a value of 4 indicates that the system is unavailable. The values of each factor are then added together to obtain
a final determining number.
Thus, if a safety system (1) has a strong safety track record
(value = 4); (2) has benefit that outweighs its cost (value = 4); and (3)
is unavailable (value = 4), the sum of the values from all three factors
yields a total of 12. If however, a safety system (1) has a weak safety
track record (value = 1); (2) has a cost that outweighs its benefit
(value = 1); and (3) is readily available (value = 1), the sum of the
values from all three factors yields a total of 3. A total of 12 indicates that a safety system is ready for present consideration. Conversely, a total of 3 indicates that a safety system is not yet ripe for
consideration and may be deferred. See Table 1 below.
Table 1. Proposed Standard for Regulation of Safety Systems

Fctors
Safety track record
Preliminary Cost-Benefit Analysis
Avalablit

TtU3

Values
(ranging from 1 -4)
1
4
1
4
1

4

12
Consider at
Defer until present
later date
time

As the totals move away from the minimum of 3 and maximum of 12, it is less clear what course of action the NHTSA should
pursue. The purpose of the factor framework, however, is not to reduce a subjective inquiry into a rigid mathematical formula. The
purpose of this exercise is to provide a structure for evaluating
whether a safety system is presently worthy of consideration. The
objective is not to translate the totals into absolute courses of action;
these totals only serve as a guide and are subject to interpretation.
The NHTSA could assign each of the above factors different
weights depending on which factor is most important in the agency's
view. For the purpose of clarity and ease of illustration in this Note,
all three factors in the framework are presumed to have equal weight.
The NHTSA could also add factors to the framework. Safety
track record, preliminary cost-benefit analysis, and availability were
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chosen as factors based on their importance in determining whether a
safety system should be considered by the NHTSA. They are not, of
course, the only factors worthy of consideration.
D. Evaluation of the ESC Active Safety System Using the
Proposed Standard
To demonstrate how the NHTSA could use such a framework,
merits of a current Active system on the market - the ESC system are evaluated.
1. Safety Track Record
To evaluate the ESC system's safety track record, the relevant
data to consider should include: (1) national government crash data,
(2) foreign government
crash data, and (3) national and foreign pri26
vate research. 1
First, national government data demonstrate the lifesaving potential of the ESC system. A 2004 NHTSA study shows that the ESC
system, an Active system, is effective at reducing single vehicle
crashes.127 The study analyzed state and federal crash data from 1997
to 2003 and compared vehicle models with the ESC system against
earlier versions of the same vehicle models without the ESC system.lzs The results demonstrated that the ESC system reduced single
vehicle crashes in passenger cars 12 9 by 35 percent and reduced such
crashes in Sport Utility Vehicles ("SUVs") by 67 percent. 30 The
study also found that single vehicle crashes resulting in fatalities were
reduced by the ESC system. The fatality reduction was 30 percent
for passenger cars and 63 percent for SUVs. 13 1 The NHTSA concluded that "[the ESC system] appears to provide safety benefits by
reducing the number of crashes due to driver error and loss of control, because it has the potential to anticipate situations leading up to
126

See supra § III(B) and accompanying notes.

127 NHTSA

ESC Preliminary Results, supra note 68 at 2-3 (single vehicle

crashes are those crashes that involve only one vehicle, and include roll-overs and
collisions with fixed objects).
128 Id.
129

Id.

(passenger cars include all cars except Sport Utility Vehicles and

trucks).
130

Id. at 3 (Table 1).

131NHTSA

ESC PreliminaryResults, supra note 68 at 3 (Table 2).
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some crashes before they occur[.]"' 132 Since the data were gathered
mainly from luxury automobiles, however, the NHTSA stated that it
would be more confident about the effectiveness of the ESC system
a "more representative cross-section" of the
once there are data from
133
U.S. automobile fleet.

Second, foreign government experience also supports the effectiveness of the ESC system. In Germany, Mercedes-Benz together
with Bosch Corporation developed the first ESC system for luxury
vehicles, which was available in the mid-1990s. 134 By 1999, Mercedes-Benz was the first automobile manufacturer to offer the ESC
system as a standard feature in its entire vehicle lineup. 35 In 2002, a
German government study found a 29 percent reduction in accident
rates for Mercedes-Benz vehicles between 1999 and 2000 where the
ESC system was a standard feature in such vehicles. 136 Specifically,
the study found that while 15,000 crashes involved Mercedes-Benz
vehicles in 1999, only 10,600 crashes involved such vehicles in 2000
and 10,700 crashes involved such vehicles in 2001.37 These figures
are consistent with what the NHTSA found in its 2004 ESC system
study.
Third, private research supports the ESC system's effectiveness as a lifesaving system. The Insurance Institute for Highway
Safety ("IIHS") found in a 2004 study that "[the] ESC [system] re,,138risk of [fatal and non-fatal] single vehicle crashes by 41
duced the
The IIHS relied on two years of state and federal crash
percent.
3
9
data.' However, the IIHS study was more detailed than the NHTSA
study, because in addition to the ESC system it accounted for design
changes that may have impacted the analysis.140 The IIHS concluded
that "[i]f all vehicles on U.S. roads had [the] ESC [system], we might
avoid as many as 800,000 of the 2 million or so single vehicle crashes
that occur each year. About 14,000 fatal single vehicle crashes oc132Id. at

1.

3 Id. at 4.
CBS News, Stability Control' for Vehicles (July 21, 2003),
(last visited
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/21/tech/main564126.shtml
Mar. 1, 2007).
134

135
136

id.
Id.

137

Id.

138IIHS Study,
139

id.

40

Id. at 3.

1

supra note 3, at 2.
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curred in 2003, which means [there is] a potential to save more than
with the
7,000 lives each year.' 14 1 The IIHS results were consistent
42
study.1
government
German
the
and
study
NHTSA
Therefore, national government crash data, foreign government crash data and private research demonstrate that the ESC Active
system has a strong safety track record. Nevertheless, the strong
safety track record must be viewed in perspective of the remaining
two factors and assigned a value based on the process explained
above. The possible values range from 1 to 4, with 1 indicating a
weak safety track record and 4 indicating a strong safety track record.
Under my proposed framework, the evaluation of the ESC system indicates a strong safety track record and therefore the ESC system receives a value of 4 for the safety track record factor.
2. Preliminary Cost-Benefit Analysis
The preliminary cost-benefit analysis under my proposed
framework first requires the determination of a safety system's National Price 43 and Lifesaving Potential. 144 Next, it requires the comparison of the safety system's National Price and Lifesaving Potential
with a currently regulated Passive system's National Price and Lifesaving Potential. Therefore, the ESC system's National Price and
Lifesaving Potential will be compared against the National Price and
Lifesaving Potential of air bags, a Passive system that is currently
regulated.
The ESC system's National Price first requires the determination of the system's average market price and second, the determination of the number of vehicles in the U.S. market.
First, the average market price is determined by sampling local and foreign automobile manufacturers that supply automobiles to
the U.S. market. A limited number of manufacturers offer the ESC
system as an option on their U.S. vehicle fleet. Most luxury vehicle
manufacturers include the ESC system as a standard feature, but they
include the cost of the safety system within the vehicle's price. Nevertheless, Chrysler offered the ESC system as an option on its 2005
Chrysler 300 for $1,025;145 Nissan offered a version of the ESC sys141

Id. at 4.

142 id.

143 See supra § III(B)(2) and accompanying notes.
144 Id.
145 Chrysler, Build & Price 2005 Chrysler 300, Options,
5.chrysler.com/vehsuite/dispatch.do (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).

http://www-
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tem as an option on its 2005 Maxima for approximately $400;146 and
Volkswagen offered a version of the ESC system as an option on its

2005 Jetta for $280.147 From this data, treating Chrysler's price as an
outlier, the current market price for the ESC system is approximately
$340. 148
Second, the most recent data on the number of automobiles in
the U.S. indicate that there are approximately 135,920,677 automobiles in the U.S. 14 9 Therefore, the ESC system's National Price, the
product of the average market price and the number of automobiles in
the U.S., is approximately $46.2 billion. 50
Having approximated the ESC system's National Price, the
next step is to calculate the system's Lifesaving Potential. The IIHS
determined that around 14,000 fatal single vehicle crashes occurred
in 2003."' The NHTSA's figures were more aggressive at 15,621
fatalities resulting from single vehicle crashes in 2003.152 Thus, the
approximate number of fatal single vehicle crashes is the average of
the IIHS and NHTSA figures: 14,810.153
The IIHS further found that the ESC system reduced the fatal-

146

Nissanhelp.com,

2005

Nissan

Maxima

Price,

http://www.nissanhelp.com/Models/2005/Maxima/Price.htm (last visited Mar. 2,
2007) (providing price of package including full size spare tire for $600. Full size
spare ordinarily costs $200, thus approximate price of VDC is $400) [hereinafter
Nissan Price].
147
JB
Car
Pages,
2005
Volkswagen
Jetta
2.5,
http://volkswagen.jbcarpages.com/Jetta/2005/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) [hereinafter Volkswagen Price].
148Compare Nissan Price with Volkswagen Price (determining average of Nissan and Volkswagen prices ($280+$400) / 2 = $340). This is a preliminary estimate
for illustrative purposes. The sample size could be increased for greater accuracy.
149 U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics,
2005 Pocket Guide to Transportation, Table 9 - 2002 Census, http://www.bts.gov/
publications/pocket guide to transportation/2005/html/table_09.html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2007).
150 (average market price x total number of vehicles in U.S. : $340 x
135,920,677 = $46,213,030,180 or approximately $46.2 billion.)
151 IIHS Study, supra note 3, at 2.
152National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Study Finds Electronic
Stability Control Benefits (Sept. 23, 2004), http://www.dot.gov/affairs/
nhtsa4204.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2007) [hereinafter ESC Study Report].
153 Compare IIHS Study, supra note 3, at 4 with ESC Study Report, supra note
149 (calculating average of IIHS and NHTSA figures (14,000 + 15,621)
14,810.5 or approximately 14,810 fatal single vehicle crashes).
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ity risk from single vehicle crashes by 56 percent. 154 The NHTSA
found that the ESC system reduced fatal single vehicle crashes by 30
percent. 155 Hence, an approximate reduction in fatal single vehicle
crashes is the average of the IIHS and NHTSA estimates: 43 percent. 156

The benefit provided by the ESC system in terms of its Lifesaving Potential is determined by examining the average fatal single
vehicle crashes at 14,810 and the average reduction in fatal single vehicle crashes at 43 percent. Forty-three percent of 14,810 is 6,368
potential lives saved per year. Thus, the ESC system's benefit, its
Lifesaving Potential, is 6,368 lives saved per year.
Having obtained the ESC system's cost and benefit figures,
the numbers must be compared to those of a Passive system that is
regulated by the NHTSA. Thus, the cost and benefit figures for air
bags, a Passive system, are determined next.
The cost of air bags was estimated by the NHTSA to be between $479.52 and $579.42 per vehicle in 1997, 157 which averaged
$529.47 per vehicle. 158 Since the number of vehicles in the U.S. in
1997 was 129,748,704, 159 the cost of requiring air bags in all vehicles
in the U.S. in 1997 was approximately $68.7 billion. r 6 The NHTSA
estimated the benefit in terms of lives saved per year to be approximately 6,840.161
154 IIHS Study, supra note 3, at 2.
155 NHTSA ESC Preliminary Results, supra note 68, at 3.
156 Compare IIHS Study, supra note 3, at 2 with NHTSA ESC PreliminaryRe-

sults, supra note 68, at 3 (calculating average of IIHS and NHTSA estimates: (56
percent + 30 percent) / 2 = 43 percent).
157 National Highway Transportation Safety Administration, Final Economic
Assessment of FMVSS 208 - Costs of Recent Passenger Car Rulemakings,
http://web.archive.org/web/20050413102527/http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/airbag/AAP
FR/econ/Chapterl0.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2007) (This cost includes added
weight and fuel impact and thus it may be slightly overstated) [hereinafter Air Bag
Cost-Benefit].
158 See Air Bag Cost-Benefit, supra note 157 (providing numbers to calculate

the average cost of air bag per vehicle: ($429.52 + $579.42) / 2 = $529.47.
'59 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANSP.

POCKET

GUIDE

TO

TRANSPORTATION,

1997

CENSUS

2000
(1999),

STATISTICS,

at

11

http://www.bts.gov/publications/pocketguide-to transportation/2000/pdf/entire.pd
f (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).

160 National Cost of air bags: (average cost per car x total number of cars in
U.S.) = ($529.47 * 129,748,704 = $68,698,046,306.88. or approximately $68.7 billion).
161 Air Bag Cost-Benefit, supra note 157. After Safety Standard 208 required
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The cost of the ESC system is $46.2 billion and its benefit is
6,368 lives saved per year. The cost of air bags, however, was $68.7
billion while its benefit was 6,840 lives saved per year. A preliminary analysis indicates that air bags cost approximately $22.5 billion
more than the ESC system, while providing a similar benefit. Therefore, a preliminary cost-benefit analysis of the ESC system yields a
benefit that outweighs its cost. Accordingly, this factor is assigned a
value of 4 under my proposed framework.
3. Availability
To determine the availability of a safety system, the NHTSA
should compare the proportion of the U.S. vehicle fleet that offers the
safety system with that of a comparable market, such as Europe. The
NHTSA stated that in 2003 only 7.4 percent of the vehicles sold in
the U.S. had some form of the ESC system.' 62 In Europe, however,
63
33 percent of the vehicles sold had some form of the ESC system.'
More recent data showed that for model year 2005, the ESC
system was a standard feature in only 21.6 percent of the vehicles
sold in the U.S. and optional in only 19.3 percent of the vehicles
sold. 164 Thus, the ESC system has limited availability in the U.S.
market. Such a finding requires giving the availability factor a value
of 3 since it is available, albeit in limited quantities.

4. Application of Assigned Values

Once a safety system has been evaluated under the factor
framework and each factor has been assigned individual values, the
decision whether to consider the system or to defer its consideration
is determined via the total value. For the ESC system (1) there is a
strong safety track record (value = 4), (2) the benefit outweighs the
air bags, the NHTSA estimated that 4,570 - 9,110 lives would be saved per year.
The average of this estimate is: (4,570 + 9,110) / 2 = approximately 6,840 lives

saved per year. Id.
162 ESC Study Report, supra note 152.
163 Dee-Ann

Durbin, Electronic Stability Control Not Gaining a Foothold in

(July
21,
2003),
Press
Market,
Associated
U.S.
Auto
http://www.theautochannel.com/news/2003/07/20/165181.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2007).
164 Auto Experts Recommend Two Key Safety Features on Vehicles,
CRASHWORTHINESS

NEWS,

Dec. 26, 2004, available at http://www.crash-

worthiness.com/articles/vehicle-safety.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
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cost (value = 4) and (3) there is limited availability (value = 3).
Thus, the sum of the factors' values is 11.165 See Table 2 below. A
total value of 3 indicates deferred consideration while a total value of
12 indicates present consideration. Therefore, a total value of 11 indicates that the ESC system should presently be considered by the
NHTSA for further evaluation instead of being deferred.
Table 2. Evaluation of the ESC Active Safety System Using the
Proposed Standard
Factors
Values (ranging from 1 - 4)
Safety track record
4
Preliminary Cost-Benefit Analysis 4
Availability
3
Total
11
Most Likely Consider
E. Next Steps After Evaluating the Safety System Using
Proposed Standard
Once the evaluation of a safety system under the factor
framework has provided guidance on whether the system should be
presently considered or deferred by the NHTSA, the agency should
make a concerted effort to act.
If the factor framework calculation indicates deferring consideration of a safety system, the NHTSA should set a date to reevaluate the system before deferring consideration. The agency
could achieve a re-evaluation cycle with periodic re-evaluations of
the safety systems. For example, it could conduct an annual, semiannual or quarterly evaluation. Thus, by consistently evaluating
safety systems under a factor framework, the NHTSA will be better
prepared to take the proper initiative to consider safety systems.
If the factor framework calculation indicates that a safety system should be presently considered, the NHTSA should actively investigate the safety system to determine the best course of action.
Regulation, however, is not the only means of making automobiles
safer for U.S. consumers. The NHTSA's purpose of "reduc[ing] traffic accidents and deaths and injuries resulting from traffic accidents"' 66 may be achieved via other means.
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First, if the problem is the lack of consumer demand for a
safety system, the NHTSA could attempt to stimulate that demand by
undertaking consumer education campaigns or by encouraging public
and private interest groups to educate consumers about the merits of
the safety system. By bridging the supply-demand gap, the NHTSA
could achieve its purpose without the expenses of regulation.
Second, the problem may be the lack of a safety system.
Automobile manufacturers may not provide the safety system on U.S.
market automobiles or may limit availability to a small proportion of
U.S. market automobiles. In such a case, the NHTSA could attempt
to stimulate supply by offering automobile manufacturers incentives
to increase the availability of the safety system on the U.S. market.
Accordingly, the NHTSA could once again bridge the supplydemand gap and achieve its purpose without the expenses of regulation.
Third, there may not be a market for a safety system because
of both the lack of demand and the lack of supply of the system.
Consumers could either be unaware of the merits of a safety system
or may not want such a system due to its cost. Likewise, automobile
manufacturers may either be unaware of the merits of a safety system
or may not want to offer the system because of its effect on the bottom-line price of a vehicle. In such a case, the NHTSA may also attempt to create consumer awareness and automobile manufacturer
awareness or it may offer incentives for automobile manufacturers to
make the safety system available on the U.S. market at a reasonable
price. However, if all else fails, the NHTSA has the option to issue a
safety standard which requires that the safety system be installed by
automobile manufacturers.

IV. Conclusion
The NHTSA's current standard for determining whether to
consider a safety system for regulatory review is loose and undisciplined. The standard leaves control over such decisions to the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, automobile
manufacturers and public and private interest groups. Although the
standard mentions pertinent factors for consideration, such as costbenefit analysis, and the likelihood of solutions, it is largely an unorganized mix of factors with no guidance for application. Thus, the
current standard fails to provide a concrete framework in which to
evaluate new safety systems.
The proposed framework for considering safety systems for
regulatory review is concrete and provides a level of objectivity.
Moreover, it equips the NHTSA with a tool to effectively consider
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the factors that it claims to currently consider. The primary factors
for the framework: (1) safety track record, (2) preliminary costbenefit analysis and (3) availability, were identified after tracing the
NHTSA's regulatory history, legislative mandate and current practice. 167 The proposed framework is an attempt to organize decisionmaking processes at the NHTSA so that valuable safety features with
lifesaving potential are not overlooked.
The primary factors were selected specifically with Active
systems in mind, because the NHTSA has largely ignored Active systems other than a TPMS - which came after the passage of a congressional act requiring the agency to consider such a system. The
agency only recently began considering ESC, an Active system that
had proven to be worthy of consideration a long time ago. Also, the
fundamental difference between Active and Passive systems calls for
a fresh approach to regulatory consideration.
The system of assigning values to each factor after an independent evaluation of each aids the decision-making process. The
approach is not intended to reduce the inquiry to a simple mathematical question. The purpose is to provide a tangible framework that allows for a structured basic evaluation.
The evaluation of a safety system for regulatory consideration
does not end after a value is determined and a decision is made
whether to presently consider the system or to defer its consideration
indefinitely. An evaluation that indicates present consideration requires the NHTSA's full attention and further concrete steps. Such
steps could involve educating consumers on the merits of a safety
system, incentivizing automobile manufacturers to make the system
readily available or further analyzing the system. If all else fails, the
NHTSA can always regulate. The agency should also seriously address an evaluation that indicates deferral of consideration. In such a
case, the safety system could be deferred to timely periodic reviews
that would continue the evaluation of the system within the framework and allow the NHTSA to actively consider safety systems for
regulatory review.
With this new approach, the NHTSA can finally be the driving force behind its own actions. The agency is no longer relegated
to a passive role in the back seat of automobile safety evaluation. It
can now take the driver's seat and steer automobile safety in the U.S.

167 See supra § III and accompanying notes.

